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Abstract
Purpose: This article aims to apply to the case of  Avianca Airlines the Analytical Model for the
Assessment of  Airline Expansion Strategies developed by Moreira (2014) in order to explain the
rationale of  the expansion strategy followed by this airline and indicate other possible expansion
strategies. 
Design/methodology/approach: This article is a case study in the sense that it aims to arrive to
broad generalizations based on the collected evidences, focusing on one of  the most traditional airlines
in the world. This article is a positivist case study, based in the positivist understanding; because it is
supported by objective facts of  the situation which are informed by the researcher’s interpretive
understanding according to it is recommended for this type of  study.
Findings: The application of  the Analytical Model for the Assessment of  Airline Expansion Strategies
above referred was successful, considering that the model was able to explain a wide range of  complex
aspects of  the Avianca’s development. Thus, being one of  the oldest airlines in continued operation in
the world, the expansion process of  this airline is connected to many political, sociological and
economic facets - ie., its general environment - of  its mother country, Colombia. The analytical model
offered the opportunity to explore these issues in a detailed manner, adding a broader comprehension
of  this airline that goes beyond its operating and economic analysis.
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Originality/value: They reside on the fact that this is the first time that this analytical model is applied
to study extensively an actual situation. Besides, airlines in Latin America have not been widely covered
by the academia and this is an opportunity to begin to fill this gap. Furthermore, the referred analytical
model is applicable to organizations or firms that operate in other industries if  the proper adjustments
are made.
Implications: The implications for the academic research are to understand that the reasons for the
success or failure of  an airline in an expansion process may be explained by the suitability between the
expansion strategy followed by this airline, its business model, its operating environment and its general
environment. Moreover, this article demonstrates that the analysis of  the suitability of  the expansion
strategy followed by a specific airline may be made in the light of  a solidly founded analytical
framework.
Keywords: airline expansion strategies, analytical model, airline business models, industry forces,
general environment, generic expansion strategies, Avianca, Taca. 
1. Introduction
This article deals with the expansion strategy followed by Avianca (which includes Avianca itself  and
several subsidiaries) in the period 2008-2012 adopting as analytical reference the “Analytical Model for
the Assessment of  Airline Expansion Strategies” developed by Moreira (2014). This article is a case
study in the sense that it aims to arrive to broad generalizations based on the collected evidences,
according to Yin’s classification (Yin, 1993). It focuses on one of  the most traditional airlines in the
world. This study is a positivist case study, based in the positivist understanding; because it is supported
by objective facts of  the situation which are informed by the researcher’s interpretive understanding
according to it is recommended for this type of  study (Cepeda and Martin, 2005; Benbasat et al, 1987). 
Avianca was chosen as a case of  study to apply the theoretical model referred above because it is one
of  the most traditional airlines in the region and it is one of  the oldest airlines in continued operation
in the world. Besides, by starting in 2010 a merging process with Taca, another traditional airline in the
region, Avianca became a pioneer of  this expansion strategy in Latin America. Continuing its
expansion, Avianca began its process to become a public company by submitting a draft registration
statement for confidential review to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on June 24, 2013.
As a consequence, many important information related to the fiscal years of  2011 and 2012 became
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public, which, in addition to the statistical data afforded by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), made possible a deeper analysis of  this remarkable airline. Apart from that, Latin
America has not been exhaustively covered by the academia in the air transport industry studies.
Probably, the unavailability of  public and reliable information prevailing until now explains, at least
partially, the absence of  interest by the scholars. 
2. The analytical model for the assessment of  airline expansion strategies
According to the Analytical Model for the Assessment of  Airline Expansion Strategies (Moreira, 2014)
three groups of  elements should be considered in the formulation of  an expansion strategy of  an
airline. The first group of  elements is the airline business model which indirectly defines the core
competencies of  an airline. The Boeing Company (2007) classifies the airline business models
considering two dimensions: stage length (short, medium and long haul) and the level of  services
supplied (low cost, mix offering and full service). From the combination of  these operating
characteristics eight airline business models are created: low fares, regionals, short/medium haul
independents, global network, all premium/business, long haul independents, broad network and
charter/inclusive tours. The figure 1 below illustrates the Boeing Airline Business Model. 
Figure 1. Airlines Business Models. (Boeing Company. (2007). Airline Strategy and Business
Models. Airline Planning Seminar’s supporting media. Quoted by Moreira, Mauricio E. (2014).
An analytical Model for the Assessment of  Airline Expansion Strategies. Journal of  Airline
and Airport Management,  4(1)) 
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The second group of  elements is the industry environment, which refers to the airline’s external
environment that influences most directly its operations. The industry environment may be analysed by
the Porter’s Five Forces Competition Model (1983) to which is added the sixth force, a concept
formulated by Nalebuff  and Brandenburguer (1997). The Porter’s five forces are suppliers’ bargaining
power, buyers’ bargaining power, substitute products, new entrant threat and competitors’ rivalry. The
Nalebuff  and Brandenburguer's sixth force in the present case are the alliances (“complementors”) and
the government.
The third group of  elements is the general environment which may be understood as being the external
environment which influences indirectly a firm and involves general aspects affecting more than one
specific industry. It encompasses economic, demographic, political, legal, social, cultural, technological
and natural aspects (Kotler & Keller, 2011).
These three groups of  elements indicate the most compatible expansion strategy that a firm can follow
in terms of  scope and process of  implementation as described below. According to Hitt, M.A., Ireland,
R.D. & Hoskinson, R.E. (2014) the expansion strategies may be classified according to the scope of  the
business involved, as follows: concentrated growth, vertical integration, horizontal integration or
diversification. Expansion strategies may also be classified according to their process of
implementation which may be internal growth, mergers and acquisitions, or alliances. 
As discussed above, there are eight airline business models (broad network, global, short haul/medium
haul independents, long haul independents, all premium/business, regional, charter/inclusive tour and
low fare). On the other hand, there are six aspects of  the industry environment to be considered
(suppliers’ bargaining power, buyer’s bargaining power, substitute products threat, new entrants threat,
competitors’ rivalry and the sixth force: alliances and government). Finally, there are eight elements
related to the general environment (economy, demography, politics, legal, social, culture, technology and
natural environment). The model is shown in the figure 2. 
Aiming to create a score to help the growth strategy selection, each dimension of  the industry
environment is divided into two possibilities (“high “and “moderate or low”). Similarly, each dimension
of  the general environment is split into two possibilities (“favourable” and “unfavourable”). Thus, these
three groups of  elements are combined individually with possible growth strategies, which are classified
by scope and growth process. Each combination is classified according to a generic value, receiving the
designation “Y”, if  the combination makes sense; “N” if  the combination doesn’t make sense; or “I” if
it is indifferent. 
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Combinations between airline business models and growth strategies types (related to both scope of
business involved and process of  implementation) that made no sense (therefore receiving the
designation “N”) were eliminated. For instance, low fare carriers don’t make alliances with other
carriers or put in practice growth strategies involving diversification and, this being so, there is no
reason to take these combinations into account. The table 1 summarises this discussion.
Figure 2. Analytical Model for the Assessment of  Airline Expansion Strategies. (Moreira,
Mauricio E. (2014). An analytical Model for the Assessment of  Airline Expansion
Strategies. Journal of  Airline and Airport Management, 4(1))
Table 1. Airline Business Models versus Growth Strategies Types. (Moreira, Mauricio E. (2014). An analytical
Model for the Assessment of  Airline Expansion Strategies. Journal of  Airline and Airport Management, 4(1))
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For the other combinations if  the specific combination is assessed as Y, it receives a mark of  1; if  it is
assessed as “N”, it receives a mark of  -1; and if  it is indifferent, it receives a mark of  0. By adding
marks for each combination a score may be created, indicating how adequate this specific growth
strategy is to the airline business model, industry environment and general environment. 
Table 2. Industry’s Six Forces versus Growth Strategies Types. (Moreira, Mauricio E. (2014). 
An analytical Model for the Assessment of  Airline Expansion Strategies. Journal of  Airline and 
Airport Management, 4(1))
Besides, the model assumes that the elements of  the general environment and the elements of  the
industry environment have not a uniform impact on the selection of  a growth strategy. In order to deal
with this aspect, the model admits the introduction of  weights that may give more relevance to one or
more aspects of  the general environment and the industry environment. For instance, probably the
element “Economy” and the element “Competitors’ Rivalry” are more relevant than the other elements
and as a consequence they should receive a higher weight. In the present article, the tables used were
built using the weight 2 for the elements “Competitor’s Rivalry” (Industry Environment) and
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“Economy” (General Environment), supposing that both have the highest impact on the growth
strategy chosen. 
The total number of  combinations generated was 904,736. This value is the result of  the multiplication
of  8 (number of  airline business models considered), by 4 (number of  growth strategies types
according to the scope of  business involved), by 3 (number of  growth strategies types according to the
process of  implementation), by 2 powered to 6 (6 industry forces each one corresponding each to 2
possibilities – high versus moderate and low), by 2 powered to 8 (8 general environment aspects each
one corresponding to two possibilities – favourable versus unfavourable), which results 1.572.864,
minus 668,128, which is the number of  combinations of  airline business models with growth strategies
types that do not make sense. 
Table 3. General Environment Aspects versus Growth Strategies Types. (Moreira, Mauricio E.
(2014). An analytical Model for the Assessment of  Airline Expansion Strategies. Journal of  Airline and
Airport Management, 4(1))
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3. Brief  historical information about Avianca 
Avianca is the second oldest airline in operation worldwide and was founded on December 5th 1919,
following KLM that was founded on October 7th in the same year. The airline was created by a group
formed by Colombians and expatriated German entrepreneurs under the name of  Sociedad Colombo-
Alemana de Transportes Aereos - SCADTA, in the city of  Barranquilla. As almost all airlines being
formed at that time, SCADTA began its operations very modestly establishing local services with small
equipment. Since the beginning SCADTA has been managed by the German partners and this would
be reason for tensions in the years before the World War II. To hide the strong presence of  German
nationals in SCADTA’s control, Pan Am bought 84% of  the shares of  the Colombian airline. However,
this mechanism was reversed later in 1940 by the establishment of  a joint-venture with SCADTA’s
major competitor, Servicio Aéreo Colombiano – SACO, under the leadership of  Pan Am and the
Colombian Government. Thus, Aerovías Nacionales de Colombia – Avianca was incorporated in
Barranquilla in June 1940.
In the post war the Colombian domestic aviation market witnessed the surging of  a plenty of  short
living airlines which were created taking advantage of  the availability of  low priced flight equipment. In
this context, by combining internal growth with the acquisition of  small airlines Avianca expanded its
regional and domestic network and has extended services to New York (1949), Lisbon, Rome, and Paris
(all in 1950). 
During the 1970’s Avianca experienced a great international expansion achieving the summit in 1976 by
establishing services between Bogota and Frankfurt, which were operated by Boeing 747s. This
florescent period came to an end in the 1980’s when the airline cumulated enormous debts. This
situation of  insolvency would be aggravated by the anti-drug efforts of  the American Government that
in practice prompted Avianca to retreat from the American-Colombian cargo market. In addition, in
1991, air transport was deregulated in Colombia increasing much the competition both in domestic and
in the international markets, impacting severely Avianca. This regulatory change associated with the
Avianca’s decadency has required a sharp restructuring in 1994 when the dominant shareholder -
Grupo Empresarial Bavaria, a major diversified local group- implemented radical measures to reduce
costs and improve efficiency followed by a strong marketing campaign.
In March 2003 Avianca filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States and has left
from it in December 2004 under the new name Aerovías del Continente Americano and retaining the
brand Avianca. In the same time the Brazilian conglomerate Grupo Synergy, which had created in 2002
the Brazilian airline Oceanair (renamed to Avianca Brasil in 2010), bought Avianca.  In the following
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year Avianca acquired Tampa Cargo from the Dutch carrier Martinair and in October 2009 Grupo
Synergy and Grupo Taca announced a strategic merger aiming to create in the following years the
largest Latin American airline in terms of  fleet size. 
TACA was established in 1931 in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, by the New Zealander Lowell Yerex. During
the 1940s TACA opened branches in several countries in Latin America including Brazil, Colombia and
Venezuela and in 1961 TACA was transferred to San Salvador adopting the Salvadoran flag. In 2000
TACA moved its operating certificate to Costa Rica because El Salvador was downgraded to the safety
rating Category 2 by the U. S. Federal Aviation Administration – FAA. However, the TACA
International Airlines’ headquarter was in El Salvador where its hub was located. During the 2000s
TACA tried to be listed in the New York Stock Exchange but it was not successful. In January 2011
TACA International Airlines (the mother company of  its group) operated in 22 airports and its
partners operated in more 25 airports. 
TACA International Airlines whose name stands for Transportes Aéreos del Continente Americano
was the company leader of  the TACA group, which included by 2011 LACSA - Lineas Aéreas
Costarricenses, and TACA Peru. TACA Regional was a business unit that included the partners
Aviateca (Guatemala), Islena (Honduras), La Costeña (Nicaragua), Sansa Regional (Costa Rica) and
Aeroperlas Regional (Panama). The partners of  TACA Regional were small airlines which operated
turbo props such as the ATR 42, Cessna Caravans, Shorts SD 360 and De Havilland Twin Otters. 
LACSA was established in 1945 by Pan American World Airways, by the Costa Rican Government and
by Costa Rican private interests and it was designed to be the Costa-Rican national carrier. In 1959 the
regional lines were transferred to Sansa. LACSA operated in around 20 airports in North, Central and
South Americas and its hub was in San Jose at Costa Rica. 
TACA Peru was founded in 1999 as Trans Am and in 2000 it was acquired by the TACA group. By
2011, TACA Peru served more than 20 airports and had its hub in Jorge Chavez International Airport
at Lima. As LACSA, its operation was totally integrated to the parent company TACA International
Airlines. It is interesting to observe that the relationships between the number of  airports served by
LACSA and TACA Peru and the number of  aircraft in their fleets was about five times (very low
frequency and sparse services), it being virtually impossible to these airlines to operate except on a
code-share basis with their parent company. 
Probably the multiple carrier operating strategy was a consequence of  the market fragmentation and
was an alternative to achieve operational and scope economies exploring intensively the opportunities
afforded by the bilateral agreements. Besides, this intricate network created a high barrier to entrance to
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new competitors and apparently was the single possible way to compete against the larger American
carriers. The merge of  Avianca and Taca received the regulatory approvals in April 2010 and a very
successful IPO happened in the Colombian stock exchange in April 2011, which achieved an
oversubscription of  five times the minimum value. The ownership of  the new airline Avianca-TACA
when the merge took place was 67% to Grupo Sinergy and 33% to Grupo TACA, being Roberto
Kriete (CEO of  TACA) the Chairman of  the Board and Fabio Villegas (CEO of  Avianca) the Chief
Executive Officer.
In November 2010, Avianca-Taca started the process to get in Star Alliance simultaneously as COPA
did and became its member in June of  2012. In May of  2013 Avianca-Taca retired the Taca brand and
the association of  airlines was renamed as Avianca Holdings S.A.
By the end of  2012 Avianca Holdings' (based in Panama) fleet in service was composed by 163 aircraft,
as follows: 10 Airbus A318, 32 Airbus A319, 51 Airbus A320, 5 Airbus A321, 9 Airbus A330, 1 Airbus
A330F, 11 ATR-42, 5 Boeing 767, 12 Cessna Caravan, 12 Embraer E-190, 5 Fokker 100 and 10 Fokker
50. At the same date, Avianca Brasil's fleet was composed by 32 aircraft, being 7 Airbus A318, 4 Airbus
A319, 7 Airbus A320 and 14 Fokker F28. It should be noted that Avianca Brasil has not ownership
relationship with Avianca Holdings. Actually, some shareholders of  Avianca Brasil are also shareholders
of  Avianca Holdings. 
By the end of  2012 the ownership composition of  Avianca Holdings was 17.7% of  preferred shares
listed on the Colombian Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Valores de Colombia); approximately 70.3% of  its
voting common shares owned by Synergy Aerospace Corp., a corporation controlled by Mr. Germán
Efromovich; and approximately 29.0% of  its voting common shares owned by Kingsland Holdings
Limited, a corporation controlled by the Kriete family. 
4. The airline business model followed by Avianca
By the end of  2012 Avianca Holdings operated an extensive route network from its hubs located in
Bogotá (Colombia), Lima (Peru), San Salvador (El Salvador) and San José (Costa Rica). Passenger and
cargo services involved more than 5,000 weekly scheduled flights to more than 100 destinations in over
25 countries around the world.  Its strategic cornerstones were: “Enhance customer loyalty through
superior customer service and a unique culture of  ‘Excelencia Latina’; Focus on achieving synergies
from the Avianca-Taca combination to increase revenues and reduce costs; to pursue opportunities for
profitable growth in its passenger segment; grow the cargo operations; and expand the LifeMiles
(loyalty) program”.  The map below shows the markets covered by Avianca Holdings flights in 2012. 
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Tables 4 and 5 below illustrate the relative importance to Avianca Holdings the markets it serves. As
may be noticed, by far the domestic market of  Colombia is the most important one for this airline
followed by North America and non-regional Central America. Besides, it may be observed that the
most important hubs for Avianca Holdings are, in order, Bogota, San Salvador, Lima and San Jose. 
Figure 3. Avianca Holdings Route Map. (Flightglobal; www.flightglobal.com)
Table 4. Distribution of  revenue passengers of  Avianca Holdings in each of  the
different regions measured by destination. (Avianca Holdings S.A. Prospectus FORM
F-1 Registration Statement, US Security Exchange Comission - SEC, 2013 June 24th).
Notes: (1) includes Mexico; (2) Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and
Uruguay; (3) Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador
Taking in account the network operated by Avianca Holdings and its strategic definitions above
summarized, one may classify this airline as being a “Broad Network” airline, according to Boeing’s
Airline Business Model. 
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Table 5. Scheduled services of  Avianca Holdings - summary by hub and other origins. (Avianca
Holdings S.A. Prospectus FORM F-1 Registration Statement, US Security Exchange Comission -
SEC, 2013 June 24th). Note: Reflects destinations served and scheduled flights as per
December 31st 2012
5. Avianca Holding industry environment
Because the hubs of  this airline are located in Colombia, Peru, El Salvador and Costa Rica these
countries will be considered as being the main environments in which this airline operates. The
assessment of  the industry environment (or the operating environment) will be made separately in
accordance to the four main markets that correspond to the hubs mentioned above. Besides, the
analysis will be conducted following the Airline Expansion Strategies Model developed by Moreira
(2014) and the emphasis will be given to the following aspects: market penetration ratio of  the air
transport industry, historical evolution of  the demand, the industry concentration, and the role played
by the Government and the alliances. 
5.1 Market penetration 
By analyzing the penetration ratio of  the air transport in a certain market in parallel with other
indicators one may have an idea of  how intense is the rivalry among the players in this market. Thus, if
the penetration ratio is high there is an indication that if  a competitor has the intention to grow it will
have to conquer market from the other competitors and this probably will trigger a process of
retaliation from the latter ones. In these conditions the rivalry among the players tends to be high. To
assess the penetration ratio in a specific market it is needed to make a comparison with the penetration
ratios existing in similar markets in the same region. Notwithstanding, it is required to equalize the
markets under comparison. In this paper, following what was made in previous works (Air Transport
Action Group – ATAG, 2014), each country was plotted in a chart in which the abscissa corresponds to
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the respective GDP per capita and the ordinate corresponds to the enplaned passengers per capita
(domestic plus international). Besides, among these points, which represent the countries, a regression
curve is plotted. This curve indicates the median expectation of  the embarked passengers per capita for
each level of  GDP per capita. Figure 4 shows the total enplaned passengers and GDP per capita in
2012 in the largest countries in Latin America and Caribbean. 
Figure 4. Total Enplaned Passengers and GDP per capita in Latin America and Caribbean in 2012.
(International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, 2014; International Civil
Aviation Organization, www.icao.int; Comisión Latinoamericana de Aviación Civil - CLAC,
http://clacsec.lima.icao.int; AeropuertosArgentinos.com, www.aeropuertosarg.com.ar; Instituto
Nacional de Estadísticas e Informática – INEI, Peru, www.inei.gob.pe). 
Notes: 1) GDP in current 2012 USD. 2) The average point was not used in the calculation of  the
regression line
Figure 4 shows that the market penetration ratios of  the air transport in Colombia, Peru and El
Salvador are close to what should be expected considering the wealth of  the correspondent economies
measured by their GDP per capita. In this manner, in the year of  2012 the penetration ratios of  air
transport in Colombia, Peru and in El Salvador were 0.28, 0.29 and 0.12, respectively. In parallel, the
penetration ratio in Costa Rica is significantly above the regression curve in the Chart 1 and
corresponds approximately to 0.50. This indicates that the total enplanements in Costa Rica is much
higher than the value of  its GDP would allow one to expect. In Costa Rica, the high penetration ratio is
surprising because domestic traffic is very small. Actually, the domestic enplanements in Costa Rica
correspond to just roughly 5% of  the total enplanements made in this country.  The reason for the high
number of  enplanements in Costa Rica is the large size of  the inbound ecotourism market from
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foreign countries. In this manner, in 2008 the tourism sector contributed 7.2% of  the GDP of  Costa
Rica and afforded 22.7% of  the revenues coming from foreign countries. In 2005 the receptive tourism
was responsible for 13.3% of  the direct and indirect jobs.  
5.2 Historical evolution of  the demand
The historical evolution of  the demand also indicates the intensity of  the rivalry among incumbents in
a certain market similarly as the penetration ratio. Thus, when the growth rate of  the demand of  the
industry is small, the revenues increment of  a particular competitor just can be made by taking a parcel
of  the revenues from the other incumbents. In this scenario, retaliation from other competitors should
be expected increasing the rivalry among competitors (Hitt et alii, 2014). Considering this aspect, it was
made an assessment of  the air transport growth rates in Colombia, Peru, El Salvador and Costa Rica
(the operating environment of  Avianca Holdings) vis-à-vis the GDP of  these four countries added, as
shown in the figure below. 
Figure 5. Year Total Enplanements and GDP added in Colombia, Peru, El Salvador and Costa
Rica. (Unidad Administrativa de Aviación Civil de Colombia, www.aerocivil.gov.co; Instituto
Nacional de Estadísticas e Informática, Perú, www.inei.gob.pe; Autoridad de Aviciacón Civil de El
Salvador, www.aac.gob.sv; International Civil Aviation Organization – ICAO, www.icao.int;
International Monetary Fund – IMF, www.imf.org)
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In fact, the econometric equation as well as the trend equation show a relevant adherence with the
historical data what is confirmed by the high R2 coefficients found (0.914 and 0.928, respectively).
Being so, the conclusions taken from this statistical analysis may the considered as being reliable. On
the other hand, the constant average growth rate – CAGR of  the yearly quantity of  passengers
enplaned (5.9%) in these four countries along the 1992-2012 is modest and is similar to the world’s
average according to ICAO. The reason is that the GDP elasticity of  the demand is just 0.796. This
means that the demand in the region has grown below to the corresponding GDP year rates. In other
words, the demand has experienced modest growth in the four countries considered together and this
indicates a scenario of  intense rivalry among competitors. The reason is that the modest growth rate of
air transport industry demand implies that aggressive airlines’ achievement of  growth targets are related
to withdraw sales from the more conservative airlines. As a rule, this situation triggers hard competition
based on fares reduction. 
5.3 Market concentration
Similarly, to the market penetration and the historical evolution of  the demand, the market
concentration prevailing in an industry plays an important role regarding the intensity of  the rivalry
among existing firms. In this way, if  a sector is not concentrated the likelihood of  rivalry among
competitors tends to be high (Hitt et alii, 2014). The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index – HHI is an
effective and a widely accepted index to measure the concentration of  an industry (Rhoades, 1993) and
will be used in this paper as one element to assess the competitiveness prevailing in the markets where
Avianca Holdings operates. 
However, some industries as the air transport of  passengers are naturally more concentrate than others.
Thus, the value of  the HHI must be interpreted comparing different markets in the same industry. The
chart below illustrates the HHI of  the domestic air transport of  passengers in different countries in
2012. 
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Figure 6. Market Concentration of  Domestic Air Transport of  Passengers in 2012 - Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). (International Civil Aviation Organization, www.icao.int). 
Notes: (*) Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is calculated by the addition of  the squares of  the
individual firms’ market shares. Un-concentrated markets are assumed as corresponding to HHI below
1500. Moderately concentrated markets and highly concentrated markets are assumed as corresponding
to HHI between 1500 and 2500, and above 2500, respectively; (**) The HHI was calculated based on
the number of  passengers embarked in 2012 on the world's twenty largest domestic markets, which
accounted for 93% of  the global domestic demand. 
As can be observed in the chart above the air transport Colombian market is a highly concentrate
(HHI=5454) in accordance to the generic interpretation of  the HHI. Besides, this market is more
concentrated than the median of  the largest domestic markets in the world. The same can be said for
the Peruvian domestic market of  passengers, whose HHi was equal to 4401. In El Salvador and in
Costa Rica the domestic markets are in practice inexistent. Thus, one may assume that the HHI in the
most relevant markets where Avianca Holdings operates are highly concentrated. Apart from this, these
markets are dominated by this airline.
As discussed above, penetration ratios of  air transport in the main markets operated by Avianca
Holdings, in average, are high, which suggests that the intensity of  rivalry among the incumbents is
high. In parallel, in the same markets, the elasticity of  the total demand to the GDP is below 1, which
indicates that these markets are highly competitive. The third indicator considered, the HHI, indicates
that Colombia, Peru, El Salvador and Costa Rica are highly concentrated markets. However, these
markets are dominated by Avianca Holdings, whose hubs are located in the respective capitals.
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5.4 Government and Alliances
The Government of  Colombia is very liberal in terms ownership clauses. The absence of  property
restrictions made possible to a Brazilian group get the control of  the largest Colombian airline as
commented above. Moreover, Avianca Holdings (formally Avianca Controller) is based in Panama. The
same happens in Costa Rica in terms of  regulatory liberality what made possible the merge of  Taca and
Avianca, even remaining the control of  the association of  these airlines in hands of  a foreign group. 
However, the regulations are very restricted in terms of  commercial terms in some international
markets, such as traffic rights and points beyond. In this manner, air services agreements involving
Colombia and Southern countries in Latin America include relevant restrictions conceived to protect
Avianca from the competition of  other Latin American airlines. Thus, the Colombia-Brazil bilateral
agreement, for instance, include tight restrictions in terms of  frequencies and fifth freedom rights to
the Brazilian side with the clear purpose to protect the Colombian carriers -ibid est, Avianca- against
the Brazilian carriers in the market Bogota-Miami. A summary of  the table of  routes of  the Air
Transport Services Agreement (ASA) between Brazil and Colombia signed in May 2009 is shown in
Table 6. 
Table 6. Air Services Agreement between Brazil and Colombia (May 2019) – Route Schedule.
(Agencia Nacional de Aviacao Civil – ANAC, www.anac.com.br) 
As can be noticed, in practice the restriction of  frequencies imposed to the Brazilian routes (4 per
week, limited to 2 to each point) makes impossible to Brazilian carriers explore the business market to
points beyond Colombia (including those located in the United States) because business passengers
demand the existence of  daily flights in both directions. Being so, it is very difficult for Brazilian
carriers achieve profitability in the route Brazil-Colombia because the access to business traffic beyond
Colombia is severely limited to them. Oppositely, the Colombian carriers may make profitable this
route because they have free access to markets located in North of  Colombia. On the other hand, the
referred ASA restricts the Colombian routes from the exercise of  the fifth freedom rights from points
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in Brazil to points in South America, Cape Town, Johannesburg, Luanda, Lagos and Dubai. Clearly
these restrictions do not compensate the limitations imposed to the Brazilian routes mentioned above
because the traffic to these latter points is very small.
Moreover, the Air Transport Agreement between United States and Colombia has a completely
different approach and there are no restrictions to the carriers of  both countries in terms of  pricing,
capacity and freedom rights as defined in the articles 2 and 11 of  the mentioned agreement. In general,
the air services agreements that Colombia maintain with other countries, with the exception of  Brazil,
follow the same model. Thus, the restrictions imposed to Brazil are far from being a doctrinal issue but
a legal casuistry aiming to protect Avianca from Brazilian competitors. 
Concerning to alliances, an important step given by Avianca (at that time, formally Avianca-Taca)
toward its expansion and consolidation as a world standard airline was its entry in Star Alliance, which
happened in June 2012. Actually, the entry of  Avianca in Star Alliance was a movement articulated with
COPA Airlines (a traditional partner of  Continental) and with United Airlines (a regional leader
associated to Star Alliance that merged with Continental in 2008) and this arrangement was facilitated
by the leadership of  Taca, which has been a partner of  United Airlines since 2006. As can be noticed,
this broad partnership has reinforced the dominance of  Avianca in its main markets. 
5.5 Other elements in the industry environment of  Avianca 
According to the “Analytical Model for the Assessment of  Airline Expansion Strategies” developed by
Moreira (2014) other elements must be considered in the airline industry environment assessment.
Thus, the buyers’ bargaining power, the suppliers’ bargaining power, the new entrants’ threat and the
substitute products threat must be considered. With the exception of  the substitute threats, the role
played by the other elements driving the competition is similar as the existing in other countries and
they follow the world standards described in IATA’s publication Vision 2050 Report. In fact, the
possibility of  the implementation of  a substitute product in Avianca Holdings operating environment,
such as the speed train, is remote as a consequence of  the scarcity of  the governmental resources for
making investments, just to quote the main obstacle. In parallel, as mentioned, the behaviour of  the
other elements present in the operating environment of  Avianca Holdings is the same as in most
countries. In this manner, the buyers’ bargaining power tends to grow but it is not high yet; the
suppliers’ bargaining power is high mainly because the fuel supply industry as well as the aircraft
manufacturers industry are very concentrate; and new entrants’ threat is high because nowadays there
are no relevant barriers to entry. Being so, for the purpose of  this paper the substitute products’ threat
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and the buyers’ bargaining power will be assumed as being low. On the other hand, suppliers’
bargaining power and new entrants’ threat will be considered as being high. 
6. The general environment of  Avianca Holdings 
According to Moreira (2014) the general environment is formed by eight groups of  elements, namely,
Economy, Demography, Politics, Legal, Social, Culture, Technology and Natural. However, in the
present case the elements Legal, Culture, Technology and Natural seem not introduce relevant
restrictions to the operation in Avianca’s main markets. In this manner, the following comments will
focus the Economy, Demography, Politics and Social issues. Besides, being Colombia, Costa Rica, El
Salvador and Peru the home base of  Avianca Holdings these countries will be considered together for
the purpose of  the analysis of  the general environment of  this airline. 
Table 7 below demonstrates that the GDP (the main external variable that explains the market demand
of  air transportation) of  the four countries considered together grows at a high average rate (11%). For
comparison, in the same period the average growth rate of  the world GDP was roughly 5%. 
In addition to the GDP there are other aspects that are helpful to be considered in the analysis aiming
to assess if  the general environment is favorable or not for the air transport activity. Thus, the
population helps to evaluate how large a specific market is. In parallel, it is reasonable to assume that
there is a positive correlation between literacy and the propensity of  the population to travel. The
unemployment rate is also important to be taken in account because a relevant share of  the air travels is
motivated by business. The wealth per capita and the income concentration indicate the portion of  the
population capable to pay for an air travel. Table 8 summarizes these population and economic aspects.
As may be noticed, the total population of  the four countries taken together is considerable and if
these countries were a single country it would be positioned in the sixteenth place in the population
world ranking. Besides, the literacy of  the population of  these countries is poor and it can be explained
by the position of  the respective GDP per capita and the Gini index. Again, if  these four countries
were a single country it would be among the poorest countries and with one of  the worst income
distribution in the world ranking. However, the unemployment rates in these countries are not so bad
and together they correspond to a country placed in the hundredth position in the world ranking. On
the other hand, the evolution of  the population, unemployment rate and year GDP per capita is very
good. Despite this, the evolution of  the unemployment rate in Costa Rica was not favorable and it is
attributable to the world economic crisis in the period, which impacted very sharply in its inbound
tourism.
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Table 7. Year GDP (current USD thousands), CAGR and position in the world ranking.
(Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database October 2014,
www.imf.org.; Central Intelligence Agency - CIA, The World Fact Book, www.cia.gov).
Notes: (*) CAGR stands for "Compound Average Growth Rate"; (**) Calculated according to
the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)
Table 8. Population, literacy, unemployment rate, year GDP per capita, Gini Index and position
in the world ranking. (Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook
Database October 2014, www.imf.org; Central Intelligence Agency – CIA, The World Fact
Book, www.cia.gov).
Notes: (*) CAGR stands for "Compound Average Growth Rate"; (**) The position of  the
GDP per capita in the world ranking was calculated according to the Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP); (***) Literacy is herein assumed as being the proportion of  the total population aged 15
and over that can read and write; (****) Year GDP per capita in current USD; (*****)
Calculated as the weighted average of  the Gini indices for each country by its population. 
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By the end of  2006 the Revolutionary Armed Forces of  Colombia (FARC) has been demobilized after
almost five decades of  conflict. In parallel, the United Self  Defense Forces of  Colombia (an anti-FARC
paramilitary group) as a formal organization had also ceased to function. The formal extinction of
these two organizations have not lead Colombia to internal peace because criminal groups, whose
members included some former paramilitaries, arose. The insurgents lacked the military or popular
support necessary to overthrow the government, but continued to attack against civilians. Large areas
of  the countryside had been under guerrilla influence or had been contested by security forces despite
the efforts of  the Colombian Government supported by the Government of  the United States. It was
just by the end of  2012 that the Colombian Government started formal peace negotiations with the
FARC aimed at reaching a definitive bilateral ceasefire and incorporating demobilized FARC members
into mainstream society and politics. Although Colombia still faces difficulties in terms of  law
enforcement, this country maintains relatively strong democratic institutions characterized by peaceful,
transparent elections and the protection of  civil liberties. 
Differently from Colombia, Costa Rica has been a stable democratic country since the late 19th
century. This situation is essentially due to the expenses of  the government in social programs, which
correspond to around 20% of  the country GDP. As a consequence, the standard of  living in Costa
Rica is the highest among their neighbors. Apart from border disputes events with Nicaragua, there are
no relevant conflicts involving Costa Rica. However, these frontier disputes with Nicaragua are not
important enough to harm the stability of  Costa Rica. As much is thus that Costa Rica has no regular
army since 1949. 
El Salvador is the smallest and most densely populated country in Central America. The fertility rate
had decreased to the replacement level nowadays as a consequence of  public policies of  contraception
implemented since 1970’s. In spite of  the poverty in El Salvador the country is politically stable and the
border disputes with Honduras are not an important issue capable to destabilize the country. 
Similarly, as in Colombia, there are still focuses of  insurgency in the countryside of  Peru. Although the
activity of  the organizations Sendero Luminoso (in English, Shining Path) and its rival Movimiento
Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (in English, Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) has decreased along
the 1990’s as a consequence of  the governmental repression, they were still felt occasionally in Peru. As
the Colombian FARC the Peruvian revolutionary groups operate in cooperation with the producers of
illegal drugs such as cocaine. Actually, Peru is the second largest producer of  the raw material for the
manufacture of  cocaine in the world. In spite of  the resilience of  these insurgent groups Peru is a
stable democracy with regular and free elections and has not faced serious crisis in this century. In
conclusion, one may consider that the economy environment where Avianca Holdings operates has
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been predominantly favorable in the period 2008-2012. Thus, the GDP growth of  the four countries
considered together was sizeable and with a high rate. Besides, the GDP per capita (although small) as
well as the unemployment rate have evolved favorably. On the other hand, the demography was
considerably favorably because the total population of  Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Peru
considered together was of  roughly 88 million, although not being wealthy. Furthermore, in the politics
field there has been a great contrast among the four countries analyzed. On one hand there was Costa
Rica with a long period of  political stability and on the other hand there was Colombia, where
insurgency has not been not totally overcome. Peru was in an intermediate position. Because Colombia
and Peru have the predominant weight in the region, one should consider that the political group of
elements has been unfavorable. Finally, the social aspects should be considered as being negative in the
period because the income distribution as well as the literacy of  the population was of  a very modest
standard. 
7. The Avianca Holdings expansion strategy. Choices and results 
In accordance to the Analytical Model for the Assessment of  Airline Expansion Strategies developed
by Moreira (2014) and by applying the conclusions above related to the airline business model followed
by Avianca Holdings (Broad Network Airline) and to the conditions of  the industry and of  the general
environment where this airline operates, one may build the expansion strategy score shown in Table 9.
As mentioned in the referred model, the better score corresponds to the better generic expansion
strategy, given the airline business model and the conditions of  the industry and of  the general
environment. 
Table 9. Generic growth strategy score for Avianca Holdings in the period 2008-2012
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As per the discussion in the section 2 above, the predominant generic growth strategy followed by
Avianca Holdings was a horizontal integration combined with an implementation process by merger
and acquisition. In this manner, the corresponding generic expansion strategy score in Table 9 is 13.
On the other hand, the best generic expansion strategy indicated by the Analytical Model for the
Assessment of  Airline Expansion Strategies is a horizontal integration combined with an
implementation process supported by alliances (score 17 in Table 9). The rationale behind the
recommendation of  the model is that the horizontal integration would leverage the potential synergies
of  the dominant position of  Avianca Holdings in its environment. In parallel, the implementation
process backed by alliances would mitigate the inherent risk of  a political unstable environment. In
spite of  not following the generic expansion strategy recommended by the model, the results of  the
expansion strategy followed by Avianca Holdings were remarkable. In this manner, the traffic statistics
of  Avianca were very positive as shown in Table 10. In this way, the constant average growth rate
achieved in the period 20018-2012 has been between 24 and 26% per year, depending on the indicator
being considered. 
It is important at this point understand the implications of  the divergence between the strategy
recommended by the model and the strategy followed by Avianca Holdings. Concerning to the scope
of  the business involved, the strategy recommended by the model is the same as the one followed by
Avianca Holdings, i.e., horizontal integration. The difference resides on the process of  implementation,
i.e., the model has recommended alliances and Avianca Holdings option was merger and acquisition.
The difference is that the path chosen by Avianca Holdings was riskier than the path indicated by the
model. It seems that the organizational culture or the style of  management of  Avianca Holdings'
investors have a high degree for risk acceptance as is suggested in the brief  cash flow analysis below in
tables 11 and 12. 
Table 10. Year passenger traffic of  Avianca Group. (International Civil Aviation
Organization, www.icao.int) 
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Table 11 below shows an unfavourable current ratio (very below 1) and table 12 shows acceptable very
short term liquidity (equal or above 30 days, according to the financial analysts of  Boeing Capital, cash
and cash equivalents of  an airline should correspond to at least 30 days of  operating expenses, being
desirable they correspond to 60 days or more). In other words, the cash flow of  Avianca Holdings had
to be managed in a very tight day-to-day basis. This confirms that the strategy followed by this airline
was a risky one. 
Table 11. Current assets and liabilities of  Avianca Holdings. (Securities and Exchange
Comission - SEC, Avianca Holdings Form 1 Registration Statements, June 2013, 23rd)
Table 12. Cash and cash equivalents and daily total Operationg expenses of  Avianca Holdings.
(Securities and Exchange Comission - SEC, Avianca Holdings Form 1 Registration Statements,
June 2013, 23rd) 
8. Conclusions 
The Analytical Model for the Assessment of  Airline Expansion Strategies was applied successfully to
analyse the expansion strategy of  Avianca Holdings. It was demonstrated that the expansion strategy
indicated by the highest score of  the model (horizontal integration implemented by alliances) is
consistent with the business model followed by Avianca Holdings as well as the industry environment
and general environment prevalent in the region. On the other hand, the predominant generic
expansion strategy followed by Avianca Holdings - horizontal integration implemented by merger and
acquisition - cannot be considered as being improper because it has taken advantage of  the benefits of
horizontal integration as suggested by the model. Thus, the leverage of  the sustainable competitive
advantages inherent to the dominant position enjoyed by this airline has been maximized. Howsoever,
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it was not a totally advisable implementation process because it was too risky considering the political
instability reigning in Colombia and in some extension in Peru. Indeed, Colombia hosts the largely
most important hub of  Avianca Holdings -Bogota- which corresponds to 64% of  the total passengers
carried by Avianca Holdinds. That is to say, the political stability in this country is crucial for the
survival of  Avianca. In parallel, the financial current ratio and the cash and cash equivalents to the daily
total expenses ratio also demonstrate that the expansion strategy followed by this airline has been risky.
Thus, one can infer that the acceptance of  a risky strategy is part of  the management style of  Avianca
Holdings.
Besides, the potential peril pointed by the model came to no trouble to Avianca Holdings because the
political situation in Colombia and Peru has evolved positively. Thus, stable and democratic
governments were able to consolidate themselves and have given impulse to healthy and consistent
economic growth in these countries. In addition, Avianca Holdings became a member of  Star Alliance,
what has reinforced its dominant presence in the region. Finally, it should be mentioned that a
successful public offering in the US stock markets is a challenging task for Avianca Holdings as a
consequence of  its not very solid financial structure and the intrinsic risk of  the airline business.
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